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Part III of the FRAME Act Policy

Performance over Pavement

Funding follows measured results

Part III · Performance over Pavement

The policy.

Part III converts the Department of Transportation from a check-writing entity into a performance-driven steward. Its center is the Pay for Performance framework (Sec. 402): performance management is not an overlay on the funding structure built in Part II but a condition of it. National goals are set out in Sec. 401 — safety, infrastructure condition, congestion reduction and system reliability, with state progress also measured on carbon reduction. Around the framework sit an incentive (the performance bonus pool, Sec. 105), a sanction (the Safety Performance Forfeiture, Sec. 403), and a data infrastructure (Secs. 407–410) designed to make state performance public, comparable and machine-readable.

Part III · Performance over Pavement

What it will do.

Under Sec. 402 every state sets data-driven performance targets for its own system, coordinating with metropolitan planning organizations and transit providers; the Secretary reviews and approves the targets. The design is deliberately not one-size-fits-all: states choose the level of ambition, but the targets must be realistic and rigorous, and they are the benchmark against which money later moves.

Sec. 105 creates the upside. A pool consisting of five percent of total block grant funds is available as a performance-based apportionment bonus to states that significantly exceed their targets — the paper’s examples are reducing per-capita vehicle miles traveled, increasing transit ridership and reducing traffic fatalities.

Sec. 403 creates the consequence, and it is confined to safety. A state that fails to make significant progress toward its safety performance targets for three consecutive fiscal years forfeits an amount equal to one percent of its formula funds. The forfeiture is not a rescission: the Secretary reinvests the money as competitive grants directly to local entities within the same state, for the projects that will most effectively reduce traffic fatalities and serious injuries.

The measurement system rests on Sec. 409, a National Transportation Data Standard making data across all 50 states consistent, comparable and machine-readable. It is published through three instruments: the annual State Infrastructure Health Report Card (Sec. 407), covering condition, performance, funding and climate impact; the Carbon and Vehicle Miles Traveled Scorecard (Sec. 408), an accounting of induced demand and carbon dioxide emissions for any project adding new general-purpose highway capacity; and the National Infrastructure Data Portal (Sec. 410), the central public repository for the condition and performance of the national system.

Part III · Performance over Pavement

What it solves.

The paper’s charge against the status quo is that federal funding operates as an entitlement based on historic formulas: money flows whether or not conditions improve, and roadway fatalities are treated as an acceptable byproduct of mobility. Because state data are disparate in format and definition, Congress and the public cannot compare performance or even state it consistently. Part III answers each defect in kind — targets approved in advance rather than narratives offered afterwards; a bonus that makes outperformance worth money; a forfeiture that makes persistent safety failure cost money, while keeping the funds inside the state and aimed at the failure itself; and a single data standard so the argument is about results, not about whose spreadsheet governs.

Part III · Performance over Pavement

Planned and measurable outcomes.

What the paper itself commits to — and, separately, the indicators it implies. The second list is drawn from the paper's logic; the paper does not state those as targets.

Stated in the paper

  • The explicit national goal of eliminating all traffic-related fatalities and serious injuries (Sec. 103, Part I).
  • Secretary-approved, data-driven state targets across safety, infrastructure condition, congestion reduction and system reliability (Secs. 401–402).
  • A performance bonus pool of five percent of total block grant funds (Sec. 105).
  • A Safety Performance Forfeiture of one percent of formula funds after three consecutive fiscal years without significant progress toward safety targets, reinvested in-state as local safety grants (Sec. 403).
  • An annual, publicly accessible Infrastructure Health Report Card for every state (Sec. 407).
  • A Carbon and VMT Scorecard for every project adding new general-purpose highway capacity (Sec. 408).
  • A National Transportation Data Standard covering all 50 states (Sec. 409) and a public National Infrastructure Data Portal (Sec. 410).

Indicators the paper implies (not stated targets)

  • Year-on-year change in traffic fatalities and serious injuries against each state’s approved target trajectory.
  • Per-capita VMT and transit ridership trends in states drawing on the Sec. 105 pool.
  • The number of states triggering the Sec. 403 forfeiture, and the fatality outcomes of the local grants it funds.
  • Publication timeliness and completeness of the Sec. 407 report cards.
  • Induced-demand and CO₂ figures disclosed under Sec. 408, project by project.

The evidence

The problem in numbers.

The problems this Part answers: projects delivered late and over budget, safety targets set but not met, and money that does not get spent on schedule.

9 of 10.

Across 258 transport infrastructure projects in 20 countries, nine out of ten experienced cost overruns; average cost escalation was 45 percent for rail, 34 percent for fixed links (bridges and tunnels), 20 percent for roads, and 28 percent overall — with no improvement over the 70 years studied.

Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl, "How Common and How Large Are Cost Overruns in Transport Infrastructure Projects?" Transport Reviews (2003). Source

40,901 deaths (2023); 39,345 estimated (2024).

U.S. traffic fatalities totalled 40,901 in 2023 on final figures. NHTSA's early estimate for 2024 is 39,345 — down 3.8 percent, a fatality rate of 1.20 per 100 million vehicle-miles, and the first year below 40,000 since 2020.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2024 early estimates, as reported by the AASHTO Journal (2025). Source

Targets missed, and no power to reject weak ones.

Reviewing 2014–2017, GAO found states did not achieve most of the fatality-related targets they had set, and nearly half of states did not provide the required assessment of progress. Under the current regime the weakness is structural: FHWA's own guidance states that "MAP-21 does not provide FHWA the authority to approve or reject State DOT or MPO established targets," and that states "may establish constant or declining targets."

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Traffic Safety (GAO-20-53, 2019), ; Federal Highway Administration, Transportation Performance Management FAQ. Source

$7.62 billion.

In FY2025, $7,624,372,190 of federal-aid obligation limitation had to be redistributed in August to states able to use it, against $8.198 billion requested; FY2023 saw $7.9 billion redistributed and FY2026 just over $7.5 billion. Billions in buying power sit idle in some states while others wait — money authorised but not moving on schedule. — Federal Highway Administration, Notice N4520.291 (FY2025 August Redistribution). https://highways.dot.gov/media/69361 ; AASHTO Journal (FY2026). https://aashtojournal.transportation.org/fhwa-unveils-august-redistribution-for-state-dots-2/ *The human cost behind figure 2 is stated in the Presentation Deck: pedestrian deaths are up 57 percent since 2000 (NHTSA/GHSA)

see Part VI.*

Why this approach is the modern one

The legacy regime measures performance but attaches nothing to the measurement. Targets are self-set, may legally decline year over year, cannot be rejected by FHWA, and — GAO's finding (figure 3) — are mostly missed with incomplete reporting of the miss. Meanwhile the delivery literature (figure 1) shows cost overrun is not bad luck but a systematic pattern that better appraisal discipline, reference-class thinking and accountability are designed to counter. FRAME rebuilds the regime around consequences: state performance targets require the Secretary's approval (Sec. 402); a Performance Bonus Pool equal to 5 percent of block grants rewards states that exceed approved targets (Sec. 105); a 1 percent Safety Performance Forfeiture follows three consecutive years of missed safety targets and is reinvested in-state as local safety grants (Sec. 403); and a public Transportation Report Card, a Carbon & VMT Scorecard and a National Transportation Data Standard (Secs. 407–410) make performance visible on common definitions. The August redistribution figures (figure 4) make the same point from the spending side: a system that must re-route more than $7.5 billion a year at the eleventh hour is not managing delivery — FRAME's obligation discipline and data standards are aimed at exactly that failure.

The international evidence supports pairing a zero goal with system redesign rather than exhortation. Sweden adopted Vision Zero in 1997 and cut road deaths from 541 in 1997 to under 200 a year by the early 2020s (192 in 2021) while traffic grew — the Safe System model FRAME writes into national policy at Sec. 103. — World Economic Forum, "Sweden's Vision Zero" summary. https://www.weforum.org/stories/industries-in-depth/sweden-zero-vision-traffic-road-deaths

Evidence check

Sweden missed its interim targets (a 50 percent reduction was sought by 2007; roughly 13 percent was achieved by 2009), and there is no U.S. precedent for a bonus-and-forfeiture regime of FRAME's design — the case rests on the documented failure of targets without consequences, not on a proven domestic model.

Part III as a designed paper.

The policy of this part, set out in full with its evidence — a printable policy paper in the FRAME series.

Download the Part III paper (PDF)